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he existence of cost-effective self-help remedies
often argues against government regulation as a
means to accomplish similar ends; and nowhere is
that more apparent than in the vast jurisprudence
that surrounds the First Amendment. On countless occasions,
courts have struck down government restrictions on
speech for the simple reason that self-help provides a
seemingly adequate alternative. Thus, when the city of 
Los Angeles arrested a war protestor whose jacket bore the
now-infamous “Fuck the Draft” inscription, the Supreme
Court held the relevant ordinance unconstitutional.
Offended viewers, the court explained, have a sufficient
self-help remedy in the form of simply averting their eyes.
Similarly, in a long line of cases involving speakers caught
advocating crime, sabotage, and other forms of violence as
a means of achieving political or economic reform, the
Court (albeit after a false start or two) again struck down
government restrictions, emphasizing that, where there is
“time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” 
This is of course not to imply that every self-help mechanism
is favored. Violence, for example, can very effectively 
discourage speech, but violence is a form of self-help to
which the government has no obligation to defer. Similarly,
hecklers from time to time chill speech by hurling insults
(and sometimes glass bottles) but, again, the government
is not required in these instances to sit idly by, and in
extreme cases might even have an obligation to intervene
on the speaker’s behalf. That said, it is nevertheless striking
how often courts invalidate government regulations simply
because plausible self-help alternatives are available. The
New York Public Service Commission was for this reason
rebuked when it attempted to prohibit power companies
under its jurisdiction from including with customer bills
pamphlets discussing politically sensitive subjects like the
use of nuclear energy. The restriction was unconstitutional,
said the Court, because offended customers have an 
adequate self-help response: they can throw any troubling
pamphlets away. More recently, the federal government
has repeatedly failed in its attempts to regulate indecency
online, again because self-help—here in the form of software
filters that empower Internet users to block speech at the
receiving end rather than interfering with speech at its
source—calls into question the government’s assertions that
the proposed regulations serve a compelling state interest, let
alone are sufficiently tailored to pass constitutional muster.
Two intuitions seem to animate these various decisions.
First, self-help in these examples makes possible diverse,
individuated judgments. It increases the flow of information
by allowing willing speakers to reach willing listeners, and
it at the same time empowers unwilling listeners to opt out
of the communication at low cost. This is attractive because
society has a strong interest in allowing each individual to
decide for himself what speech to hear. There are of course
caveats to this argument; as I will argue below, sometimes
individual judgments should be trumped and listeners should
be forced to consider information and confront viewpoints
that they would rather avoid. However, in most instances,
deferring to the individual is attractive, and thus self-help
is favored because it offers listeners significant flexibility to
choose what they will hear and also what they will ignore.
Second and perhaps more important, self-help in these
examples reduces the government’s overall role in regulating
speech. The First Amendment is suspicious of government
regulation not only because regulation inevitably brings with
it the possibility that some manipulative government official
will use a seemingly innocuous regulation 
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remainder. With respect to government involvement,
meanwhile, violence and extreme forms of 
heckling both actually increase the need for 
government intervention. They do so by creating
situations where the government must step in to
protect public safety.
Courts sometimes insert a third consideration
into the mix: the notion that self-help should be
preferred only in instances where it will be “equally
effective” in terms of achieving the objective that
the government regulation itself would target. I
do not embrace this third consideration because,
in my view, the First Amendment at the very least
must represent a commitment to sacrifice some
modicum of efficacy in order to reduce government
involvement in speech regulation. Besides, assertions
along these lines are squarely inconsistent with
the facts of the foundational cases. The option 
of averting one’s eyes to avoid exposure to an
offensive message, for example, is not as protective
as a government intervention that would forbid
the dissemination of such messages in the first
place. The unwilling audience member will 
typically have to confront at least a glimpse of
the offensive message before knowing to turn
away, and the process of watching for offensive
messages itself necessarily reminds unwilling
audience members of exactly the communications
they were hoping in the first place to avoid. 
Similarly, fighting speech with speech is certainly
not as effective as prohibiting the troubling
speech ex ante, among other reasons because
speech in rebuttal rarely garners as much attention
as the more sensational speech to which it is
designed to respond. As Eugene Volokh has 
previously noted, to claim otherwise in any of
these cases is to unfairly impugn the motives and
competency of the relevant lawmakers, in essence
accusing them of indefensibly opting for law
when self-help would have done just as well.
Worse, these assertions hide an important step
in First Amendment analysis: comparing the loss
in efficacy to the gains associated with removing
a formal government regulation on speech.
My examples thus far all explore this intuition
that, in the context of the First Amendment, the
existence of a plausible self-help remedy poses a
challenge to the government’s claim that direct
intervention is required. But in First Amendment
jurisprudence the opposite argument also plays a
prominent role: where a “captive audience” has
no effective self-help mechanism by which to
avoid exposure to a given communication, that
absence of a plausible self-help mechanism is
taken to be an argument in favor of direct 
government regulation. The point was perhaps
most famously made in Cohen v. California, the
case I mentioned earlier involving the offensive
anti-war jacket. The city of Los Angeles
defended the arrest in that case on the ground
that, because citizens cannot avoid occasionally
coming to the local courthouse for official 
to in fact advance a particular viewpoint—a classic
First Amendment concern—but also because
even well-intentioned regulations can, given the 
enormous influence of the state, inadvertently
skew public discourse. The V-Chip offers a sharp
example for this latter concern. The V-Chip is a
government-facilitated technology that helps
parents filter television content. Television 
manufacturers are required to build the filter
into every new model thirteen inches or larger;
and the filter works by reading ratings that are
encoded onto broadcast television signals. Those
ratings evaluate each program based on a scale
that focuses primarily sexual content, language,
and violence, and the scale thus makes it easy for
parents to filter based on these characteristics.
But (and here is the problem) the scale does
nothing to help parents filter based on other
characteristics, such as religious overtones or
political content. The result is that parents who
might have previously taken the time to help
their children make educated choices based on a
combination of all five factors might now opt for
the easier approach of just focusing on the 
government-facilitated three. If that happens—an
open question given how few families currently
use the V-Chip—the government’s intervention
will have skewed content decisions: the importance
of the favored characteristics will be amplified 
at the expense of characteristics not included in
the official rating scheme.
The V-Chip example is all the more troubling
because the content skew I describe here was not
inevitable. Suppose, for example, that the V-Chip
were designed not to filter based on specific 
predetermined characteristics, but instead to 
filter using collaborative filtering techniques. My
family would identify fifteen programs that we
deem appropriate. The collaborative filter would
use those choices to identify other families with
similar tastes. Then the filter would use the
choices made by those other families to make
recommendations to my family, and it would
use future choices made by my family to make
recommendations to those other families. Never
would any of us need to be explicit about what
characteristics drive us to disapprove of one 
program while favoring another. And, rather than
being limited to choose based on the government’s
three characteristics, our pattern of choices might
naturally result from a complicated balance of
hundreds of different characteristics, namely ones
on which we and like-minded families implicitly
agree. The government-imposed skew inherent
in the current system would be removed; and the
very same First Amendment interests championed
by self-help in my original examples—individuation,
and a reduction in the chance that government
regulation will intentionally or inadvertently favor
one perspective or subject over another—would
at the same time be vindicated.
These two touchstones—individuation, and a
reduction in government involvement—do
more than help to identify cases where self-help
might offer an attractive alternative to government
regulation; they also help to identify types of
self-help that ought to be disfavored. Heckling,
for example, drowns out and discourages speech
that otherwise might have been warmly received
by a willing audience. It is therefore unattractive
on grounds of individuation. Violence similarly
is an obstacle to individuation in that it allows a
subset of the audience to impose its will on the
Courts sometimes insert
a third consideration
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campaigns, with much of that money ironically
spent to attract the sort of voter attention that
the captive audience would naturally provide.
Against this backdrop, audience captivity has
genuine and unappreciated appeal. Consider
again the courthouse at issue in Cohen. Why not
allow unfettered speech in the courthouse?
Surely it is implausible to think that citizens will
stop showing up for city business, or will wear
blinders and earplugs as they walk through the
public halls. Just the same, it is implausible to
think that the government will in response build
fewer courthouses in an attempt to indirectly
accomplish its original speech-restricting purpose.
Thus, harnessing the captive audience in this
instance would not lead to any significant behavioral
responses. Society would end up with a new
mechanism by which to promote exposure to
diverse views, and that mechanism would come
at relatively low cost given that neither unhappy
citizens nor an unhappy government would do
much to resist the effort. In short, captive audiences
offer an inexpensive way to accomplish goals
that society today accomplishes through the
more costly mechanisms I outline above. That is
not to suggest that every captive audience should
be harnessed in this manner, or that using captive
audiences in this way would fully obviate the
need for those other approaches. My point is
only that the existence of a captive audience
should not be understood solely as a reason to
regulate speech. Captive audiences can be put to
beneficial use; and that fact is ignored today in
First Amendment jurisprudence.
Let me be more concrete. I propose here that
the existence of a captive audience is properly
understood as a reason to allow unfettered
speech, and thus the burden on the government
to justify a restriction on speech should be
higher in instances where a captive audience is 
in play than it would be were there no captive
audience present. With respect to public 
transportation systems, then, audience captivity
should make us skeptical of a rule that bans
advertisements. Why, we should ask, is the 
government wasting such a golden opportunity
to promote diverse communication? In the 
courthouse, I would similarly be suspicious of
any speech-restrictive rule. There might be good
reasons for some such rules—perhaps a restriction
is necessary to protect children from inappropriate
images, or to ensure that court business can be
conducted without too much distraction—but,
whatever the reasons, I would judge them by a
higher standard than that normally applied, 
precisely because a captive audience is too valuable
an asset to without justification waste. Again,
this is in contrast to current thinking, where the
absence of audience self-help mechanisms is
considered to be a reason to allow government
regulation, not an argument against it.
This might sound crazy to some readers; but
note that society in other settings already makes
strategic use of captive audiences. For example,
every four years the major television networks all
simultaneously air the presidential debates. This
is wasteful, in that the broadcasts are largely
redundant; but there is little public opposition
because everyone understands that this is an
attempt to create artificial captivity. If NBC
were to offer the option of watching baseball
instead of the presidential candidates, a good
many citizens would accept the invitation. Thus
the Federal Communications Commission 
pressures NBC not to let viewers off the hook so
easily, and the networks thereby together create 
a captive audience and use that audience to pass
along hopefully revealing information relevant
to the election. 
My argument here is made in similar spirit. A
captive audience is attractive because it offers an
opportunity to pressure individuals to do that
which they privately disfavor, and to exert that
pressure at low cost in terms of unwanted 
self-help responses. The strategy should not be
used to excess. But, where a captive audience
naturally exists, the First Amendment should at
least ask questions before allowing the government
to squander the resource.
business, and once in the courthouse they 
cannot avoid being exposed to communications
originating around them, the city ought to be
allowed to prohibit malicious speech within
courthouse walls. Captive citizens have no 
self-help options, argued Los Angeles city officials,
and that lack of any plausible self-help alternative
justifies a speech restriction that might otherwise
not be permissible.
The captive audience argument was rejected in
Cohen, but the theory has been invoked in many
other instances, and with varying degrees of 
success. For example, when the city of Shaker
Heights, Ohio, decided to allow advertisements
to be displayed inside its public transit system,
four Justices emphasized audience captivity as an
important factor in justifying a government
restriction on the types of advertisements allowed,
and a fifth would have gone farther and on this
argument banned advertisements entirely. By
contrast, when the city of Jacksonville, Florida,
enacted an ordinance designed to stop drive-in
movie theaters from displaying potentially 
offensive visuals in instances where the images
would be visible from the public streets, six 
Justices endorsed the view that the government
can selectively “shield the public” in cases where
“the degree of captivity makes it impractical for
the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure,”
but the six then announced that in this particular
situation the necessary degree of captivity was
not realized because drivers could simply look
away. Personal residences are a setting where
concerns about captivity have had particular bite,
presumably on the rationale that citizens in their
homes should have maximal protection from
communications they might find offensive. Thus,
in the leading case, the Federal Communications
Commission was found to have acted within
constitutional boundaries when it prohibited the
use of certain vulgar words on the radio, both
because “material presented over the airwaves
confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also
in the privacy of the home,” and because home
audiences are captive, with the only plausible
self-help solutions being relatively unattractive
options like changing the channel at the first sign
of offense or refusing to listen to the radio at all.
Important distinctions can be drawn between
these several examples, in that they vary with
respect to the nature of the speech at stake, the
severity of the speech restriction being challenged,
and the degree of audience captivity involved.
Those details aside, however, the central insight
here is that, where relevant at all, the existence
of a captive audience is seen to argue exclusively
in favor of government restrictions on speech.
That is in my view a fundamental mistake. The
absence of plausible self-help remedies is not
merely a deficiency that the government ought
to be allowed to address, but also an opportunity
that the government ought not be allowed to
without justification squander.
Think of it this way: we as a society have a
strong interest in finding ways to ensure that each
of us is exposed to a wide variety of conflicting
perspectives. Society in fact expends significant
social resources in pursuit of this goal, tolerating
repulsive speech like that which originates with
hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan; accommodating
protesters even at abortion clinics where their
message will inevitably upset already fragile 
emotions; requiring broadcasters to air programming
devoted to education and news even though
viewers would strongly prefer other television fare;
limiting plausibly efficient industry consolidation
in and across the radio, television, and newspaper
industries for fear that consolidation might lead
to conformity in thought or perspective; and,
among many other examples, spending real tax
dollars each election cycle to finance political
The captive audience
argument was rejected
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